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This paper analyzes the regional variation of minimum wage in China. We first
introduce the institutional background of China’s minimum-wage policy and then
describe the regional variation of the minimum wages using detailed minimum-
wage data since the late 1990s. A large regional variation exists in the period
studied, and the regional variation has been declining since the late 1990s. Economic
factors, including GDP, economic structure, and consumption level, are the main
determinants for the large regional variation in the minimum wages. There is
evidence suggesting that the regional variation is influenced by political factors, such
as competition of local officials.
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1 Introduction
Wages in China were set by the authority in the earlier economic regime of central
planning, and no labor market existed. With the establishment of socialist market
economy, the labor market has started to function (Chi et al. 2012). Employers have
autonomy to hire and fire workers, and the workers have more freedom to choose em-
ployers. The wages are mainly determined by the labor market conditions. Meanwhile,
wage inequality increases. In particular, the low wages of those disadvantaged workers
(less educated, young workers, laid-off workers, rural-to-urban migrants) constitute a
major contribution to the rising wage inequality (Xing and Li 2012).
The minimum-wage policy was supposed to serve several purposes including in-
creasing the income of low-paid workers, guaranteeing living standard of their families,
and reducing income inequality. The complication of the minimum-wage policy varies
considerably across countries (Rani et al., 2013). Some countries set a uniform mini-
mum wage for the whole country, while others set minimum wages for different re-
gions, industries, or employment of different characteristics such as age, gender, and
education levels. In China, the minimum wages vary across regions, and existing stud-
ies use variation of this dimension (as well as temporal variation) to identify the effect
of minimum-wage policy on wages, employment, inequality, etc (see Fang and Lin
2014; Yang and Gunderson 2014). However, little is known about the factors that influ-
ence the regional variation of the minimum wages. This paper aims to describe the
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institutional background for the determination of regional minimum wages and to ex-
plore mechanisms behind this variation.
We first describe the procedure for the adjustment of local minimum wages, empha-
sizing China’s decentralized feature and the incentives of the local government. Then,
we describe the regional variations of the minimum wage using detailed minimum-
wage data. We find a large regional variation during the period studied. Meanwhile,
most inequality measures we use suggest a decline in the regional variation especially
after 2004. Third, we explain the regional variation in the minimum wages using city-
level variables collected from the city statistical yearbook. Economic development fac-
tors, including GDP, economic structure, and consumption level, are the main driving
force for the large regional variation in minimum wages. Finally, there also is weak evi-
dence suggesting that the regional variation is influenced by political factors, such as
competition between officials of different locations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the literature related
to the determination of the minimum wage. Section 3 introduces the institutional back-
ground of the minimum-wage policy in China. Section 4 introduces the data and de-
scribes the regional variation in minimum wages and its trend. Section 5 uses
econometric model to explore the factors that influence the regional variation of the
minimum wage. Section 6 explores the variation in the time when new minimum wages
were implemented. Section 7 discusses the implications of our results for reforming
China’s minimum-wage policy and concludes.
2 Literature review
Conceptually, minimum wage should be determined according to its goals, which vary
considerably over time and across countries with different institutions. Such goals in-
clude poverty reduction (Stigler 1946; Sobel 1999), increasing the total income of
minimum-wage workers (Sobel 1999), reducing inequality (Johnson and Browning
1983), and even industry upgrading, which is forcing firms to adopt more advanced
labor saving techniques (Stigler 1946). Textbook economics show that unemployment
increases if the minimum wage is set above the market equilibrium level. An optimal
minimum-wage policy is determined by the trade-off between those goals and the ad-
verse employment effect. That is why considerable amount of effort has been spent to
estimate the unemployment effect of the minimum wage. Unfortunately, the literature
has not reached a consensus regarding the employment effect of the policy (Card and
Krueger 1995; Neumark and Wascher 2008).
In this context, minimum wages should be determined by factors related to living
standard, labor cost, income distribution, and employment situations. Importantly, the
minimum wage should be related to some economic parameters. For example, Sobel
(1999) points out that the minimum wage should be set where the labor demand elasti-
city is unitary to maximize the total income of minimum-wage workers.
However, most research shows that the minimum wage is heavily influenced by polit-
ical factors. Such factors include voting, interest group pressure, and partisan ideology.
Flinn (2011), for example, documents the fierce political conflicts regarding whether
the federal government should set minimum wages for each state. Sobel (1999) asks
whether the adjustment of the minimum wage is influenced by political factors other
than economic factors, and he finds that unions play an important role. Many other
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studies show that the passage of the minimum-wage legislation and its subsequent in-
creases are mainly driven by interest group pressures (Silberman and Durden 1976;
Kau and Rubin 1978; Bloch 1980, 1993; Seltzer 1995). Empirically, researchers looked
at the relative power of some interest groups (the union vs. business ratio, for example,
Sobel 1999; Johnson 2002), voting in congress elections, and ideological factors (Kau
and Rubin 1978). But, these variables do not readily apply in China.
When minimum wages vary across regions as in China, the process is often decentra-
lized, and the local governments play an important role. First, they have more auton-
omy to set the minimum wages according to local economic conditions. Second,
minimum wages could be an instrument for them to manage local economy and to
compete with other regions. On the one hand, higher minimum wage might be a signal
of better economic performance that not only attracts quality workers but also en-
hances promotion probability of local officials. On the other hand, higher minimum
wage increases labor cost and deters capital investment. When labor and capital are
mobile across regions, this will be a real concern for local governments. They are
forced to consider each other’s behavior.
Political consideration influences not only the level of the minimum wages but also
the effective date of the changes and the number and timing of the series of steps
(Sobel 1999). In this paper, we will discuss how the timing of the minimum adjustment
is related to the magnitude of its changes.
Thus, the paper is related to a growing literature that studies the promotion competi-
tion between local officials (Li and Zhou 2005). Existing studies show that this competi-
tion (like a tournament model) plays an important role in China’s economic growth.
The basic story is as follows: Officials who are more capable of producing high GDP
growth have higher probability of being promoted. This provides a strong incentive for
local officials to take measures to boost the local economy. Guo et al. (2013) indicate
that personal characteristics of the local officials have a significant effect on the local
policies such as the supply of land for different uses. As the minimum-wage policy
might influence the local economy in many ways (firm profits, firm’s location choice,
employment), it serves as a potential instrument of this competition.
3 Institutional background of the minimum-wage policy in China
China’s minimum-wage policy came into shape in the early 1990s. In late 1993, the
former Ministry of Labor issued Provisions of Minimum Wage, the first document on
the minimum-wage policy. This policy did not have substantive effect because it is
poorly implemented. In 2004, the Provisions of Minimum Wage was amended substan-
tially by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. The new provisions are
different from the old version in the following aspects: (1) minimum wages are applic-
able to all enterprises including the town and village enterprises (TVEs), privately or in-
dividually owned enterprises, and non-profit organizations like schools and hospitals.
(2) Hourly minimum wages was introduced into the system, which is applied to part-
time employment. (3) The new regulation requires local governments to adjust the
minimum wage at least once in every 2 years. (4) It requires the local government to
publicize the minimum wages through public media. (5) The enforcement of the
minimum-wage policy is strengthened.
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Under the new regulation, employers are more likely to abide the regulations as the
punishment for the violation of this provision has increased significantly (it could be as
high as five times of the wages detained). Meanwhile, the department of human re-
sources and social security of the local government has the authority to inspect the en-
forcement of the minimum-wage regulations within its jurisdiction. Unions of different
levels can monitor the implementation of the minimum wage, and they can demand
enforcement and penalty if violation of the minimum-wage provisions was found.
Local governments play a dominant role in the process of adjusting minimum wages.
The basic procedure is as follows: The department of human resources and social se-
curity at the provincial level (including province, autonomous regions, and municipal-
ities administered directly by the central government) works out a minimum-wage
schedule for negotiation. This schedule is made according to the guidance of the cen-
tral government (the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security), which is usu-
ally a guideline for calculating minimum wages taking into consideration various
factors. These firstly include factors influencing the living standard of people in poverty
such as urban consumer price index and the subsistence expenditure of the urban resi-
dents. As minimum wages above the equilibrium market wages will increase the labor
cost of the employers and therefore reduce employment, employment situation should
also be considered. Finally, the minimum wage should be adjusted according to
whether it includes the social security fees and housing funds paid by the employees.
Economic development level varies a lot within a province, and the provincial govern-
ment usually applies several minimum wages according to the economic development
level of different regions. Usually, the provincial capital city has the highest minimum
wage, while remote poor regions apply the lowest. Even for the provincial capital city, it
may include some relatively poor counties in suburban areas, which may choose lower
minimum wages.
This adjustment plan will then be negotiated between several parties, including the pro-
vincial government, provincial-level unions, association of entrepreneurs/enterprises, and
chamber of commerce. The local government of the lower level can also influence the
minimum-wage schedule. For example, a prefecture-level city may negotiate a lower level
minimum wage (or simply choose a lower level of minimum wage) due to the concern
that high minimum wages are harmful for local governments to attract investment and to
create employment.
After reaching an agreement, the plan will often be submitted to the provincial ex-
ecutive meetings for discussion. The provincial executive meeting is usually convened
by the governor or the vice-governor of a province. Thus, provincial leaders can also
influence the minimum-wage policies, the influence depending on the relative power
and preference of the leaders. In particular, the local officials need to compete for
higher positions. The minimum-wage policy might be an instrument in the competi-
tion. First, minimum wage could be a direct measure for the welfare of the local resi-
dents, with higher minimum wages representing a higher economic development level
and higher living standard. Thus, the local officials tend to set a higher minimum wage,
a so-called keep-up-with-the-Joneses effect. On the other hand, a high minimum wage
might be harmful for the economy by deterring investments and reducing employment
because from the perspective of the employers, a region with lower minimum wage
seems more attractive due to lower labor cost. But, there also are some local
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governments, who believe that higher minimum wage will help them attract skilled
workers.1 Whether these incentives (mechanisms) exist and the extents they matter are
subject to empirical investigation.
The minimum-wage policy determined by the provincial government will then be
submitted to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security for approval. It
should be ratified by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and All-China Feder-
ation of Industry and Commerce. This minimum-wage adjustment policy should be
publicized through the government gazette and at least one local newspaper within
7 days of approval.
The Minimum Wage Provisions issued in 2004 requires the local (provincial) govern-
ment to adjust the minimum wages at least once in every 2 years but does not mandate
the exact date of the adjustment. Local governments often choose different dates to an-
nounce the newly adjusted minimum-wage policy.
4 Regional variation of minimum wage and its evolution
We use several data sets in the following analysis. The minimum-wage data is collected
from various websites as every province publishes them once new minimum wages are
determined. When a province publishes the minimum-wage policy, it declares the
minimum-wage levels applicable to various regions or it allows the local government to
choose appropriate levels. Different from other studies, we use the most detailed (disag-
gregated) minimum-wage data. Second, we collect city-level information from the
China City Statistical Yearbook, including the average wages for the urban workers,
GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, employment, unemployment, and actually utilized
foreign direct investment (FDI). We use this information to construct explanatory vari-
ables to explain regional minimum wages (see below in Section 5).
As the effective date of the new minimum wage is not necessarily at the beginning of
a year, we average the minimum wage according to the months applicable within a year.
In addition, in order to match our minimum-wage data with the city-level variables, we
also calculated weighted average of the minimum wages using the employment of the







among which, MWjct is the minimum wage in county j of city c at time t and employjct
is the employment of the same region at time t. Using a similar formula, we are able to
calculate the minimum wage at the provincial level. Having detailed minimum-wage in-
formation has the advantage that we cannot only have different measures of the re-
gional minimum wage (the highest level and lowest level of the minimum wages, in
addition to the weighted average of the minimum wage) but also can describe the re-
gional variation more fully. For example, we can calculate the regional variation of the
minimum wage within a city or within a province.
Finally, in addition to the absolute value of the minimum wages, we also investigate
the relative minimum-wage levels, which is the minimum wage divided by the average
wage of all the workers in the region. The formula is as follows:









AWct is the average wage in city c at time t, which can be obtained from the China
City Statistical Yearbook. MWjct and employjct are as previously defined.
Before describing the regional variation of the minimum wage, we investigate the
trend of minimum wages at the national level. Figure 1 shows that the average mini-
mum wage for the whole nation increased significantly between 2004 and 2010. How-
ever, the increase is slower than that of the wages for urban workers, and the ratio of
minimum wage over average wages decreased significantly during this period.
To see the regional variation, Fig. 2a reports the average number of minimum wages
applied within a province and such a number for the whole China in each year. The
solid line in the figure shows that the number of minimum wages for a representative
province decreased significantly. In 2004, an average province applied over five mini-
mum wages, and by 2012, it has decreased to less than four. If we count minimum
wages of different levels for China as a whole, the number increased in recent years.
This seemingly contradictory phenomenon is caused by the fact that different provinces
become less likely to have minimum wages of the same level than before.
Figure 2b further reports another dimension of the regional variation for the mini-
mum wages, namely the ratio of the highest over the lowest minimum wages (high-to-
low or HL ratio) for each province and for China. Again, the regional gap appears to
have decreased from the late 1990s. In around 2000, the ratio was 1.5 for an average
province, and it decreased to 1.3 by 2012. The same pattern is also observed for the
whole country, with the ratio decreasing from 3.5 in around 2000 to 2.5 in 2012.
We also use two traditional inequality indices (Gini coefficient and the coefficient of
variation) to investigate the trend in the regional variation of the minimum wages (see
Fig. 2c). In calculating them, each county is treated as an observation, without
Fig. 1 Minimum wage and average wage for China, 2004–2010
Xing and Xu IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:8 Page 6 of 22
considering relevant population within that county. Both measures show that the re-
gional variation has declined, especially after 2004.2
There is large heterogeneity in terms of the regional variation within a province.
Table 1 reports the regional gap of minimum wages within each province in 2004 and
2012. In 2004, the minimum wages were low in most provinces, ranging from 253
(Jiangxi province) to 603 (Shanghai) RMB. Guangdong province applied minimum
wages of 14 levels: Shenzhen applied the highest minimum wage (607 RMB), while
Heyuan applied the lowest (288 RMB), the high-to-low ratio reaching 2.07.3 This is
Fig. 2 Regional variation of minimum wages within a province and within China (a. Number of minimum
wage levels; b. The High-to-Low ratio of the minimum wages; c. inequality in minimum wage levels.)
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consistent with the fact that the development within Guangdong is regionally unbal-
anced, with Shenzhen and Guangzhou having high economic growth while other inner
cities grew slower. Provinces that applied minimum wages of 10 levels also include An-
hui and Liaoning. In 2012, no province had over ten minimum wages. Guangdong ap-
plied six, following Anhui (seven). The high-to-low ratio also decreased for over two
thirds of the provinces.
We run regressions of the number of minimum wages and the HL ratio within a
province on provincial characteristics to explore associated factors, and the results are
reported in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 shows that both measures are positively associ-
ated with provincial population, especially in more recent years (2000–2007); they are
Table 1 Minimum wages by province, 2004 and 2012
2004 2012
Province Average Max Min # of mw Max/min Average Max Min # of mw Max/min
Anhui 312 410 290 10 1.52 712 1010 680 7 1.49
Beijing 495 495 495 1 1.00 1260 1260 1260 1 1.00
Fujian 324 480 280 7 1.71 897 1200 830 4 1.45
Gansu 304 340 300 3 1.13 839 980 860 4 1.14
Guangdong 369 684 330 14 2.07 925 1500 850 6 1.76
Guangxi 330 460 320 4 1.44 819 1000 690 4 1.45
Guizhou 309 400 320 3 1.25 801 930 740 3 1.26
Hainan 358 500 350 3 1.43 788 1050 900 3 1.17
Hebei 376 520 420 3 1.24 1058 1320 1040 4 1.27
Henan 257 380 240 3 1.58 913 1080 820 3 1.32
Heilongjiang 288 390 235 7 1.66 677 1160 850 4 1.36
Hubei 277 400 240 5 1.67 827 1100 750 3 1.47
Hunan 346 460 320 7 1.44 885 1160 870 4 1.33
Jilin 323 360 300 3 1.20 919 1150 950 3 1.21
Jiangsu 425 620 360 4 1.72 997 1320 950 3 1.39
Jiangxi 253 360 270 4 1.33 715 870 610 5 1.43
Liaoning 288 440 230 11 1.91 891 1100 780 5 1.41
Inner Mongolia 344 420 380 3 1.11 962 1200 900 4 1.33
Ningxia 342 380 320 3 1.19 960 1100 950 3 1.16
Qinghai 264 370 330 4 1.12 924 1070 1050 3 1.02
Shandong 356 410 290 5 1.41 1044 1240 950 3 1.31
Shanxi 355 520 400 4 1.30 906 1125 855 4 1.32
Shaanxi 275 320 245 4 1.31 881 1000 790 4 1.27
Shanghai 603 635 635 1 1.00 1408 1450 1450 1 1.00
Sichuan 270 450 230 7 1.96 891 1050 800 4 1.31
Tianjin 501 530 510 2 1.04 1273 1310 1310 1 1.00
Tibet 306 495 445 3 1.11 1171 1200 1150 2 1.04
Xinjiang 325 480 300 9 1.60 949 1340 980 4 1.37
Yunnan 304 470 350 3 1.34 949 1100 830 3 1.33
Zhejiang 491 620 440 4 1.41 1170 1310 950 4 1.38
Chongqing 342 400 330 4 1.21 931 1050 950 2 1.11
Average 4.81 1.40 3.48 1.28
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also positively associated with rural-urban income gap and the degree of openness
(measured as the ratio of trade volume over GDP), but the correlations are sometimes
insignificant and the correlation is stronger in earlier years (1995–1999). These patterns
suggest that both the number of minimum-wage levels and the HL ratios reflect the re-
gional imbalance (heterogeneity) within a province. Other factors also influence these
two measures: GDP per capita is generally positively correlated with the within-
province variation; the share of tertiary industry is negatively correlated with the
within-province variation. In the model explaining the number of minimum-wage
levels, the adjusted R2 is around 15 %, suggesting that there are many other factors in
play as well. The model is more successful in explaining the HL ratio, but still, the ad-
justed R2 is only around 30 %.
It is also important to keep in mind that we are trying to explain the within-province
variation, which is only a portion of the overall regional variation. In Table 3, we de-
compose the variance in the minimum wage into three parts: variance due to provincial
differences, city-level differences within a province, and county-level differences within
a city. If we look at the minimum wage in absolute terms, over 60 % of the variation
comes from provincial-level difference and 31 % from city-level difference. Variation
within a city is less important, accounting for less than 10 %. This is consistent with
the fact that the minimum wages are determined at the provincial level.
We next consider the relative level of minimum wages, which is the ratio of mini-
mum wage to average wage of this region. The ratio is calculated at the city level: we
first calculate the average minimum wage for each city and divided it by the average
Table 2 Explaining the number of minimum-wage levels and the high/low ratio within a province
Number of mw Max/min
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995–2007 1995–1999 2000–2007 1995–2007 1995–1999 2000–2007
Ln(population) 0.810c 0.226 1.043c 0.121c 0.0587 0.150c
(0.223) (0.396) (0.310) (0.0229) (0.0422) (0.0295)
Ln(GDP per capita) 1.276a 2.231a 0.783 0.0782 0.169 −0.00300
(0.712) (1.158) (0.966) (0.0730) (0.124) (0.0917)
Tertiary sector share in GDP −5.765a −3.995 −6.981a −0.291 0.471 −0.817b
(2.995) (5.997) (3.678) (0.307) (0.640) (0.349)
Urban-rural income gap 0.759b 1.574c 0.369 0.0574a 0.145b 0.000945
(0.327) (0.546) (0.426) (0.0335) (0.0583) (0.0405)
Ln(average wage) −2.437a −3.066 −1.463 −0.419c −0.743c −0.121
(1.292) (2.114) (1.752) (0.132) (0.226) (0.166)
Trade share in GDP 1.218a 2.159 0.986 0.327c 0.719c 0.202c
(0.656) (1.335) (0.769) (0.0673) (0.143) (0.0730)
Fiscal expenditure in GDP 2.618 −1.328 3.573 0.503a 0.689 0.496
(2.526) (6.004) (3.171) (0.259) (0.641) (0.301)
Fixed investment/GDP −1.542 −8.145b −0.750 −0.215 −0.988b −0.203
(1.511) (3.564) (1.951) (0.155) (0.381) (0.185)
N 365 141 224 365 141 224
Adj. R2 0.146 0.136 0.153 0.284 0.299 0.349
Standard errors in parentheses; a, b, and c represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
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wage of the same city. We calculate the statistics of the relative minimum-wage distri-
butions for each province, which are reported in Table 4. The mean relative minimum
wage varies a lot across provinces, ranging from 40 % (like in Shanxi, Hebei) to 20 %
(Beijing) in 2004. The range is around 18–33 % in 2010.
Similar to the statistics for the absolute value, there is a large variation for the relative
minimum wage within a province. Take Anhui province, for example. In 2004, the
minimum wage was only 19.5 % of the average wage in the region with the lowest rela-
tive minimum wage, while the highest ratio was 37 %. The within-province variations
of the relative minimum wages also vary considerably across provinces. The province
with the largest standard deviation of the relative minimum wage was Hubei in 2004,
which is 0.10. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing had the lowest standard devi-
ation, zero. Around two thirds of the provinces experienced decreases in the regional
variation between 2004 and 2010.
5 The determinants of minimum wage
What determines minimum wages of different regions? This section explores this ques-
tion by running regressions of the minimum wages on candidate explanatory variables.
Our goal is to explain the regional variation rather than to identify the causal relation-
ship. Therefore, we do not use panel data models. However, we control for city-fixed ef-
fects in some regressions later.
In a decentralized system, local economic conditions play an important role in deter-
mining the minimum wages. We use GDP per capita (in log) to capture the local eco-
nomic development level and use GDP growth rate to capture the dynamics of the
economy. Although GDP level is expected to be positively correlated with the mini-
mum wage, its growth rate is not. For example, a growth-rate-seeking leader may pur-
posely set a low minimum wage to attract investment. The share of the tertiary sector
in GDP reflects the structure of the local economy, and a more advanced economy usu-
ally has a higher share of the tertiary sector and also has a higher minimum wage.
However, the tertiary sector includes many sub-sectors that are of quite different na-
ture. Therefore, we also control for the share of the service sector in GDP. As the ter-
tiary share and the service share contain different information, we consider both in the
regression.
Because the unemployment effect is a main concern of minimum-wage setting, we
consider employment rate, which is calculated as the share of the employed in the total
working-age population. As both working-age population and the employment could
be endogenously determined, minimum wage is not necessarily positively correlated
with employment rate. For example, the population may become larger in a high
minimum-wage region while the employment remains unchanged (or even declines),
causing a negative relationship between employment rate and minimum wage (Harris
Table 3 Decomposing the regional variation of minimum wages
Variation across a
province (%)
City variation within a
province (%)
County variation
within a city (%)
Minimum wage 60.40 30.75 8.86
Average wage 39.23 60.77 0.00
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and Todaro 1970). Another measure we consider is the number of enterprises per
capita, which is more related to employment opportunities.
Private employment share captures the importance of the private sector, which may
reflect the relative power of the employees/employers in the private sector. FDI share
reflects the importance of foreign investment in the economy. Fiscal expenditure re-
flects the relative size of the government, and it is related to the employment of em-
ployees in the public service sector. Finally, while the local GDP reflects more of the
general economic development, local consumption level is more related to the living
standard of workers. We consider consumption per capita both in rural and urban
areas because minimum wage often varies considerably within a city. In regions with
the lowest minimum wage, rural consumption level may be more appropriate for
Table 4 Minimum wages relative to average wages by province, 2004 and 2010
2004 2010
Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D.
Anhui 0.195 0.368 0.292 0.044 0.161 0.264 0.207 0.028
Beijing 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.000 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.000
Fujian 0.208 0.311 0.245 0.032 0.212 0.335 0.259 0.042
Gansu 0.183 0.459 0.303 0.077 0.184 0.370 0.283 0.067
Guangdong 0.197 0.420 0.286 0.067 0.205 0.344 0.260 0.040
Guangxi 0.261 0.373 0.320 0.038 0.216 0.502 0.274 0.073
Guizhou 0.307 0.342 0.324 0.016 0.263 0.303 0.280 0.017
Hainan 0.341 0.411 0.376 0.050 0.291 0.298 0.295 0.005
Hebei 0.310 0.439 0.375 0.037 0.234 0.298 0.262 0.022
Henan 0.184 0.378 0.269 0.056 0.226 0.378 0.295 0.039
Heilongjiang 0.186 0.529 0.314 0.091 0.215 0.458 0.289 0.078
Hubei 0.171 0.589 0.310 0.100 0.244 0.651 0.332 0.109
Hunan 0.257 0.473 0.315 0.058 0.201 0.331 0.268 0.039
Jilin 0.204 0.441 0.326 0.082 0.253 0.411 0.319 0.057
Jiangsu 0.220 0.359 0.299 0.040 0.199 0.245 0.222 0.015
Jiangxi 0.228 0.433 0.303 0.053 0.213 0.303 0.255 0.030
Liaoning 0.177 0.351 0.234 0.047 0.172 0.335 0.261 0.040
Inner Mongolia 0.268 0.422 0.347 0.058 0.196 0.350 0.268 0.045
Ningxia 0.239 0.329 0.293 0.036 0.177 0.250 0.222 0.029
Qinghai 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.000 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.000
Shandong 0.158 0.365 0.289 0.048 0.217 0.350 0.256 0.031
Shanxi 0.344 0.554 0.412 0.063 0.184 0.355 0.272 0.049
Shaanxi 0.220 0.300 0.272 0.024 0.196 0.294 0.238 0.027
Shanghai 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.000 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.000
Sichuan 0.185 0.338 0.244 0.039 0.195 0.358 0.281 0.038
Tianjin 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.000 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.000
Xinjiang 0.249 0.281 0.265 0.023 0.233 0.299 0.266 0.046
Yunnan 0.210 0.437 0.307 0.068 0.203 0.355 0.256 0.051
Zhejiang 0.221 0.320 0.275 0.032 0.220 0.355 0.279 0.039
Chongqing 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.000 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.000
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calculating the minimum wage. In richer regions, however, urban consumption may be
more appropriate.
As we are mainly using the variables of the city-level characteristics from the city
statistical yearbook, we have several choices for the dependent variables to be used in
the regression. First, we use the log of the highest minimum wage within a city, and the
results are reported in columns 1–4 in Table 5.
Economic development seems to be the major factor that influences the minimum
wage. In particular, GDP per capita, economic structure (share of the tertiary industry
in GDP), and the per capita number of enterprises are strong predictors for the city-
level minimum wages, and these variables are positively correlated with the minimum
wage at the significance level of 1 %. The amount of FDI (relative to GDP) is also posi-
tively correlated with the minimum wage but only marginally significant at the 10 %
level. In the second column, we control for the consumption level in both rural and
urban areas within the city. This decreases the number of observations of city-year
Table 5 The determinants of the minimum wages at the city level, OLS
Dependent variable =
Log(highest minimum wage within a city) Log(lowest minimum wage within a city)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.138c 0.103c 0.0389c 0.00738 0.128c 0.0711b 0.0147 −0.00956
(0.0239) (0.0328) (0.0138) (0.0216) (0.0229) (0.0311) (0.0205) (0.0298)
Employment rate −0.120 −0.152 0.0292 0.0314 −0.212 −0.234 0.0365 0.0433
(0.162) (0.191) (0.0879) (0.174) (0.138) (0.168) (0.116) (0.229)
GDP growth rate −0.221a −0.272b −0.118a −0.00639 −0.0390 −0.174 −0.0834 0.0120
(0.113) (0.115) (0.0675) (0.0832) (0.145) (0.163) (0.0950) (0.0920)
Tertiary sector share 0.280c 0.225c 0.0680b −0.136 0.262c 0.181a −0.0252 −0.102
(0.0672) (0.0731) (0.0287) (0.0897) (0.0919) (0.0941) (0.0551) (0.117)
Private employment
share
−0.137 −0.244b 0.0378 −0.0249 −0.105 −0.196 0.0150 0.0259
(0.0934) (0.0922) (0.0459) (0.0580) (0.127) (0.120) (0.0629) (0.0535)
FDI share in GDP 0.515a 0.394 0.401a 0.166 0.429 0.173 0.361 0.299
(0.276) (0.316) (0.198) (0.124) (0.384) (0.400) (0.265) (0.190)
Fiscal expenditure/
GDP
−0.138 −0.0891 −0.119a −0.0815 0.164 0.191 0.114a −0.0433
(0.161) (0.154) (0.0656) (0.111) (0.174) (0.159) (0.0604) (0.133)
Service sector/GDP 0.867 0.663 0.0892 −0.203 0.327 0.675 −0.0169 0.178
(1.184) (1.073) (0.586) (0.684) (1.361) (1.334) (0.538) (0.844)
Per capita number
of enterprises
0.0159c 0.00916c 0.00186a −0.00475 0.0200c 0.00944c 0.00323 −0.00573
(0.00360) (0.00303) (0.00102) (0.00400) (0.00437) (0.00336) (0.00208) (0.00546)
Ln(consumption
per capita)_rural
0.00858 0.0323 0.00291 0.110b 0.0993c 0.0643
(0.0434) (0.0194) (0.0370) (0.0468) (0.0292) (0.0519)
Ln(consumption
per capita)_urban
0.258c 0.217c 0.0491 0.252c 0.151c 0.0407
(0.0712) (0.0394) (0.0682) (0.0796) (0.0361) (0.0773)
Province dummies No No Yes No No No Yes No
City dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2042 1866 1866 1866 2042 1866 1866 1866
Adj. R2 0.846 0.858 0.933 0.951 0.791 0.819 0.909 0.940
Standard errors in parentheses; a, b, and c represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
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from 2042 to 1866, but the pattern remains unchanged. The urban consumption level
is highly significant. Column 3 controls for provincial dummies, which reduces the
magnitude and the significance level of most variables. One major change is that the
coefficient on the share of employment in private sectors becomes positive and insig-
nificant rather than being significantly negative. Column 4 further controls for city
dummies. Unsurprisingly, most of the coefficients become insignificant.
In columns 5–8, we consider another measure: log of the lowest minimum wage
within a city. Without controlling for province dummies, the results are similar to
those in columns 1–2, but the effects of those proxy variables for economic develop-
ment are smaller in magnitude. Another difference is that the lowest minimum wage
within a city is positively correlated with the consumption level of the rural areas.
The adjusted R2 in Table 5 suggests that the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are
fairly successful in explaining the variation of the minimum wages. The explanatory power
of the model is 80–85 % without controlling for regional dummies, and it reaches over 90 %
when provincial dummies are controlled for. The marginal gain in the explanatory power is
low if we substitute provincial dummies with city dummies, consistent with the fact that
province-level difference constitutes the major proportion of the regional variation.
As we include year dummies in our regressions, and the minimum wage increases
significantly, it is possible that the year dummies play a major role in explaining the
minimum wage. We next run regressions for each year, and without losing important
information, we report the results for 2003 and 2009 in Table 6. Column 1 reports the
results for 2003. The listed variables altogether can explain half of the variation across
cities. However, only two variables (GDP per capita and consumption per capita for
urban residents) are significant at the 5 % level. Controlling for provincial dummies in-
creases the explanatory power by nearly 40 % from 0.513 to 0.881 (see column 2). If we
use the lowest minimum wage within a city as the dependent variable (columns 3–4),
GDP per capita becomes less important both in the magnitude and the significance
level of its coefficient. The consumption in rural areas becomes significant, regardless
of whether we control for provincial dummies. Again, city-level characteristics are not
enough to capture relevant differences at the province level.
In 2009, the explaining power of these variables reaches 60 % when the highest mini-
mum wage within a city is used as the dependent variable. Controlling for province
dummies increases the R2 to 0.853. It suggests that province-level differences become
less important or the differences are highly correlated with the city-level characteristics.
Some new patterns emerge as we run regressions for each year. For example, GDP
growth rate turns out to be negatively associated with the minimum wage. One explan-
ation for this correlation is that a lower minimum wage is beneficial for GDP growth
conditional on the economic development level.
Next, we consider the relative minimum wage. We have two alternative dependent
variables: the ratio of the highest and the lowest minimum wage within a city to the
average wage of that city. The results of using these two measures are similar to each
other (see Table 7). Several factors that are positively correlated with the absolute value
of the minimum wage turn to be negatively correlated with the relative minimum wage,
including the GDP per capita and the per capita consumption of the urban residents.
This suggests that the high GDP region have higher average wage, which might be in-
fluenced more by the high-income individuals. The fiscal expenditure share in GDP is
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insignificant in explaining the absolute minimum wage (see Tables 5 and 6), but it turns
negatively correlated with the relative minimum wage in Table 7. The relative number
of the scaled enterprises and the share of the service sector in GDP are positively corre-
lated with the relative minimum wage. These patterns largely remain when we run re-
gressions for separate years (see Table 8).
It is worth mentioning that we are less successful in explaining the relative minimum
wage than in explaining the absolute value of the minimum wage in terms of the adjusted
R2 in the OLS regressions. For example, the adjusted R2 is only around 10 % in the regres-
sion for 2009 when the province dummies are not controlled for. Even with the province
dummies being controlled for, the explaining power is only around 40–45 %. However, al-
though many studies focus on the relative levels of the minimum wages, it is the absolute
values that are determined by the tripartite negotiation process.
6 The time to adjust the minimum wages
The new provisions issued in 2004 require the local governments to adjust the mini-
mum wage at least once in every 2 years. The local governments decide when to do so.
Table 6 The determinants of minimum wages in 2003 and 2009, OLS
2003 2009
Max Max Min Min Max Max Min Min
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.109b 0.0494b 0.0818a 0.0230 0.115c 0.0502b 0.0802b 0.0307
(0.0409) (0.0209) (0.0479) (0.0239) (0.0287) (0.0183) (0.0297) (0.0217)
Employment rate −0.484a −0.203 −0.612a −0.141 0.0778 0.140 0.193 0.167
(0.274) (0.169) (0.318) (0.124) (0.177) (0.0876) (0.199) (0.142)
GDP growth rate −0.448 −0.232a −0.260 −0.00420 −0.666c −0.221c −0.570b −0.318a
(0.322) (0.129) (0.352) (0.133) (0.197) (0.0708) (0.220) (0.183)
Tertiary sector share 0.0458 −0.00792 0.0403 −0.0464 0.367c 0.155c 0.324b 0.0729
(0.0981) (0.0582) (0.135) (0.0486) (0.0948) (0.0558) (0.126) (0.105)
Private employment
share
−0.104 0.0834 −0.260 −0.209b −0.278b −0.0547 −0.134 0.0402
(0.272) (0.132) (0.341) (0.0867) (0.109) (0.0688) (0.135) (0.0923)
FDI share in GDP 0.524 0.656c 0.330 0.700c −0.266 0.113 −0.818a −0.0560
(0.387) (0.206) (0.415) (0.234) (0.383) (0.205) (0.415) (0.327)
Fiscal expenditure/GDP −0.197 −0.154 0.349 0.133 −0.0715 −0.0678 0.130 0.0892
(0.314) (0.144) (0.313) (0.114) (0.104) (0.0940) (0.0990) (0.0873)
Service sector/GDP 0.612 0.811 −0.500 0.737 0.599 −0.362 −0.501 −0.768
(2.133) (0.809) (2.090) (0.597) (0.806) (0.799) (1.350) (1.056)
Per capita number of
enterprises
0.0109 0.00512 0.00890 0.00940b 0.0101c 0.00331b 0.0108b 0.00490a
(0.00869) (0.00405) (0.00884) (0.00454) (0.00345) (0.00142) (0.00391) (0.00264)
Ln(consumption per
capita)_rural
0.0135 −0.00786 0.119b 0.103b 0.00467 0.0415 0.100a 0.0944b
(0.0429) (0.0303) (0.0519) (0.0437) (0.0428) (0.0248) (0.0529) (0.0381)
Ln(consumption per
capita)_urban
0.245b 0.192c 0.293b 0.0563 0.110 0.157c 0.0690 0.0572
(0.109) (0.0602) (0.124) (0.0607) (0.0736) (0.0381) (0.0869) (0.0488)
Province dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 240 240 240 240 262 262 262 262
Adj. R2 0.513 0.881 0.479 0.899 0.591 0.853 0.460 0.763
Standard errors in parentheses; a, b, and c represent significance levels of 10, 5, and 1, respectively
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Table 7 The determinants of the relative minimum wages, OLS
Dependent variable =
Log(highest minimum wage within a city/average wage) Log(highest minimum wage within a city/average wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per capita) −0.00458c −0.00126 −0.00324c −0.000811 −0.00447c −0.00168a −0.00336c −0.00111
(0.000465) (0.000787) (0.000687) (0.000875) (0.000421) (0.000944) (0.000606) (0.000941)
Employment rate 0.00127 0.0118 −0.00278 0.00690 0.00106 0.0143a −0.00144 0.00712
(0.00485) (0.00890) (0.00605) (0.0115) (0.00396) (0.00805) (0.00523) (0.0109)
GDP growth rate −0.00330 −0.00552 −0.00269 −0.00405 −0.00269 −0.00489 −0.00189 −0.00362
(0.00449) (0.00359) (0.00446) (0.00378) (0.00414) (0.00329) (0.00405) (0.00342)
Tertiary sector share −0.00146 −0.00446 −0.00133 −0.00368 −0.00274 −0.00268 −0.00268 −0.00202
(0.00193) (0.00322) (0.00196) (0.00342) (0.00195) (0.00350) (0.00194) (0.00356)
Private employment share −0.00199 −0.00185 −0.000602 −0.00271 −0.00303a −0.00114 −0.00124 −0.00163
(0.00178) (0.00280) (0.00187) (0.00362) (0.00169) (0.00240) (0.00195) (0.00298)
FDI share in GDP 0.00755 0.00387 0.00944a −0.000662 0.00763 0.00721 0.00874 0.00220
(0.00470) (0.00523) (0.00513) (0.00547) (0.00516) (0.00553) (0.00567) (0.00585)
Fiscal expenditure/GDP −0.0124c −0.0113c −0.0123c −0.00783b −0.00697a −0.00885c −0.00652a −0.00629a
(0.00377) (0.00326) (0.00338) (0.00357) (0.00379) (0.00310) (0.00325) (0.00338)
Service sector/GDP 0.0181 0.00900 0.0442 0.0190 0.0124 0.0000916 0.0342 0.0197
(0.0308) (0.0508) (0.0358) (0.0556) (0.0228) (0.0459) (0.0279) (0.0501)
Per capita number of enterprises 0.000289c 0.000206 0.000334c 0.000194 0.000303c 0.000162 0.000325c 0.000142
(0.0000956) (0.000146) (0.000105) (0.000177) (0.0000655) (0.000134) (0.0000677) (0.000170)
Ln(consumption per capita)_rural −0.000166 −0.000602 0.00122 0.000700
(0.000949) (0.00203) (0.00101) (0.00215)
Ln(consumption per capita)_urban −0.00456b −0.00631b −0.00531c −0.00552a
















Table 7 The determinants of the relative minimum wages, OLS (Continued)
Province dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 2033 2033 1862 1862 2033 2033 1862 1862
Adj. R2 0.260 0.432 0.263 0.390 0.273 0.459 0.247 0.396
















Table 8 The determinants of the relative minimum wages in 2003 and 2009, OLS
2003 2009
Max Max Min Min Max Max Min Min
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP per capita) −0.0000853 −0.00216b −0.000730 −0.00257c −0.00241b −0.00374c −0.00280c −0.00368c
(0.00131) (0.00101) (0.000992) (0.000732) (0.000877) (0.000869) (0.000723) (0.000792)
Employment rate −0.0242b −0.0163b −0.0224b −0.0111a 0.00448 0.000359 0.00641 0.00170
(0.0104) (0.00744) (0.00847) (0.00561) (0.00517) (0.00615) (0.00518) (0.00531)
GDP growth rate −0.0109 −0.00231 −0.00476 0.00356 0.000781 0.00807 0.00361 0.00534
(0.0118) (0.00807) (0.0103) (0.00706) (0.00827) (0.00748) (0.00852) (0.00719)
Tertiary sector share −0.00402 −0.00193 −0.00290 −0.00164 −0.00279 −0.00529a −0.00296 −0.00583b
(0.00317) (0.00319) (0.00297) (0.00247) (0.00453) (0.00293) (0.00369) (0.00263)
Private employment share 0.00403 0.000513 −0.000623 −0.00600b −0.00886c −0.00528a −0.00493a −0.00291
(0.00745) (0.00348) (0.00717) (0.00288) (0.00245) (0.00259) (0.00274) (0.00272)
FDI share in GDP 0.0223 0.0104 0.0162 0.0101 0.00870 0.00822 −0.00162 0.00441
(0.0135) (0.00958) (0.0118) (0.00717) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.00866)
Fiscal expenditure/GDP −0.0260c −0.0218c −0.0123a −0.0140b −0.00689 −0.00537 −0.00301 −0.00215
(0.00821) (0.00748) (0.00671) (0.00554) (0.00467) (0.00417) (0.00411) (0.00436)
Service sector/GDP 0.0935 0.0833a 0.0534 0.0675a 0.0998a 0.106c 0.0595 0.0810b
(0.0574) (0.0415) (0.0433) (0.0336) (0.0516) (0.0358) (0.0471) (0.0331)
Per capita number of enterprises 0.000392 0.000558a 0.000312a 0.000602c 0.000330c 0.000270c 0.000295c 0.000272c
(0.000238) (0.000287) (0.000168) (0.000175) (0.0000752) (0.0000770) (0.0000761) (0.0000682)
Ln(consumption per capita)_rural −0.000874 −0.000248 0.00172 0.00235 −0.00288b −0.00153 −0.000929 −0.000476
(0.00180) (0.00187) (0.00173) (0.00181) (0.00115) (0.00116) (0.00129) (0.00129)
Ln(consumption per capita)_urban −0.0125c −0.0102b −0.0104c −0.0123c −0.00152 0.000929 −0.00160 −0.000933
















Table 8 The determinants of the relative minimum wages in 2003 and 2009, OLS (Continued)
Province dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 240 240 240 240 258 258 258 258
Adj. R2 0.251 0.488 0.234 0.529 0.135 0.450 0.095 0.401
















It is interesting to see whether the timing of the minimum-wage adjustment is related
to regional characteristics and more importantly to minimum-wage levels. Two alterna-
tive stories can be told.
The first is the race-to-the-bottom story. The local officials compete in GDP growth
performance to gain better chances of promotions. If they believe that higher minimum
wage drove up labor costs, deterred potential investors, and eventually harmed growth,
they have incentives to set minimum-wage levels lower than competing regions. A
province that adjusts its minimum wage later would choose lower levels than a similar
province that adjusts the minimum wage earlier. The second story, which we heard of
often in conversation with officials and scholars, is the keep-up-with-the-Joneses one.
Local officials do not want to have minimum wages lower than competing provinces,
for several reasons, justified or unjustified. First, higher minimum wage is itself an indi-
cator of better economic performance, which might be valued in official promotions.
Second, while seeming unfriendly to employer, it may help a region attract quality
workers, which seems to be truly believed by some local officials.4 If the keep-up-with-
the-Joneses hypothesis is true, provinces adjusting their minimum wages later should
choose higher minimum wages.
In both theories, announcing the new minimum-wage policy later allows the local
government to observe the new policy of other local governments. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the local government tends to adjust the minimum-wage policy later,
which leads to the procrastination of the minimum-wage adjustment within a year.5
Table 9 reports the number of provinces that implement new minimum wages in
each month from 1995 to 2007. There is a considerable variation in the time chosen
for new minimum wages, and also the variation changed from 1995 to 2007. In earlier
years, most local governments chose January and July, the starting point of a year or
the half year. From around 2003, more provinces choose the last two quarters in a nat-
ural year to implement their new minimum wages. A regression of the month of adjust-
ment on a year gives a coefficient of 0.25, and the standard error is 0.04. This might be
due to the fact that local governments compete on minimum-wage levels and waiting
allows them to observe the action of other provinces.
Table 9 Month when new minimum wage was implemented
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
January 12 7 8 8 4 4 3 5 6 6 5 1 3
February 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
March 0 0 1 1 1 3 4 3 3 0 1 2 1
April 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1
May 4 5 4 3 3 2 3 3 1 3 2 3 2
June 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
July 7 10 9 11 15 15 14 11 11 10 10 7 5
August 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
September 0 2 4 4 4 2 0 2 3 2 3 6 4
October 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 6 8 6 7 7
November 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 3
December 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3
Total 28 29 30 30 30 30 30 31 31 31 31 31 31
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Is there any relationship between the month of minimum-wage adjustment and
minimum-wage levels?6 Announcing the minimum wage later allows the local govern-
ment to observe the behavior of its peer local governments. If the race-to-the-bottom
story dominates, the local government would like to set a lower minimum wage than
its competitors. On the other hand, if the keep-up-with-the-Joneses story dominates,
local governments will set a higher minimum wage than their competitors. Which story
dominates in reality is subject to empirical test.
Table 10 provides a rigorous empirical study, where we regress the level of minimum
wages on the month of minimum-wage adjustment and a set of other control variables.
These control variables are important as they allow us to compare regions with similar
economic development levels. In the first row, we use the highest level of minimum
wage within a city as the dependent variable. The results suggest that regions adjusting
their minimum wages later tend to have slightly higher minimum wages. In the second
row, we use the natural log of the highest minimum wage within a city as the
dependent variable. Again, the coefficients on the month of minimum-wage adjustment
are significantly positive but small in magnitude, none of them greater than 1 %. In
panel C, we use the relative minimum wage (the ratio of the highest minimum wage
within a city to the average wage of the city) as the dependent variable, and we get
similar results. Using the lowest minimum wage within a city (panels D to E) produces
similar results.
These results indicate that local governments want to keep up with the Joneses, but
at the same time, they do not want to raise minimum wages too much higher than
other provinces with the risk of damaging growth.




A: the highest level of mw within a city 2.811a 1.957a 1.543
(1.602) (1.106) (1.203)
B: Ln (the highest level of mw within a city) 0.00761b 0.00734c 0.00621b
(0.00323) (0.00258) (0.00291)
C: The highest level of mw within a city relative to average wage 0.0000794 0.000218c 0.000224b
(0.0000767) (0.0000791) (0.0000890)
D: the lowest level of mw within a city 1.187 1.952a 1.712a
(1.751) (0.999) (0.996)
E: Ln(the lowest level of mw within a city) 0.00431 0.00767c 0.00688b
(0.00428) (0.00249) (0.00279)
F: The lowest level of mw within a city relative to average wage −0.00000654 0.000195c 0.000205b
(0.0000705) (0.0000699) (0.0000761)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies No Yes No
City dummies No No Yes
The controls that are not reported are the same as those in Table 8. Standard errors in parentheses; a, b, and c represent
significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
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7 Discussions and conclusions
The emerging literature on minimum-wage policy in China reflects a growing demand
for redefining the labor relations in the Chinese labor market. Minimum-wage policies,
along with unions, and collective bargaining are discussed of more often than ever in
both academia and public policies. Although there are many studies showing the im-
pact of China’s minimum-wage policy on wages, employment, and inequality, large or
small, significant or insignificant, expected or unexpected, results in this paper suggest
that the significant increase in the minimum wage is mainly a reflection rather than a
cause of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy.
China is a large country with economic development levels varying substantially
across regions (Kanbur and Zhang 2005). It decentralizes the implementation of the
minimum-wage policy, leading to a large regional variation in minimum wages. Our
findings have a major implication in making predictions about the regional variation in
minimum wages in the future. The basic pattern we observe is that the regional vari-
ation has been declining. A question then emerges: will the regional variation continue
to decrease? The answer seems to be yes, for the following reasons. First, the simple ex-
trapolation of the existing trend predicts fewer levels of minimum wages within a prov-
ince and declining HL ratios both within a province and within the whole country. If
we assume a linear trend in the number of the minimum wages within a province, the
number will decrease to around 3 by 2020, and the HL ratio will decrease to around
1.2. Second, this prediction is supported by our regression results as well (see Table 2).
For the HL ratio results in particular, the share of the tertiary sector in GDP is nega-
tively correlated with the HL ratio, and the trade share and the rural-urban income gap
(the latter not being significant for the periods 2000–2007) are positively correlated
with the HL ratio. The most possible changing direction of these factors points to a de-
creased regional variation: the share of the tertiary sector will increase continuously,
China will become less dependent on export to boost its economy, and the rural-urban
income gap has shown a declining trend. All suggest a lower within-province HL ratio
in the future.
What about the regional difference in the minimum wage for the whole country? Al-
though the number of minimum-wage levels shows no consistent trend, the HL ratio,
the Gini coefficient, and the coefficient of variation decrease significantly. This is
consistent with the fact that the regional wage gaps for unskilled workers de-
creased in recent years. Whalley and Xing (2014) show that while the wage gaps
across a province for skilled workers increased significantly between 2002 and
2007, those of the unskilled workers decreased. As the unskilled workers constitute
a major part of the population targeted by the minimum-wage policy, the conver-
gence of regional wages for them suggests a convergence in the minimum-wage
levels across regions.
Endnotes
1Shenzhen, for example, http://www.cnr.cn/2004news/internal/200505310023.html
2We also calculate the standard deviation of the regional minimum wages. Because
this measure depends on the level of minimum wages, it increases. Once we use the na-
ture of minimum wages, the standard deviation also declines, which is consistent with
the results we report in the paper.
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3In the end of 2004, the minimum wages applied in Guangzhou and Shenzhen were
684 and 610 RMB, respectively. The new minimum wage in Guangzhou is only applic-
able after December 1. It was 510 RMB before that date.
4Among the five reasons to raise minimum wage in 2008, local officials in Shenzhen
point out that raising minimum wage will help them attract skilled workers (http://
sztqb.sznews.com/html/2008-06/03/content_199567.htm accessed on 2014-12-17).
5Although the new regulation in 2004 mandates the local government to adjust the
minimum wages at least once in every 2 years, most of the provinces adjust the mini-
mum wages once a year.
6This question was partly inspired by a conversation to a government official in
Shenzhen. He said Shenzhen raised its minimum wage to 1600 Yuan/month in February
2013, which was overtaken by Shanghai in April. But the differential is only 20 Yuan,
which is symbolic rather than substantive.
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